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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1293 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
SALAHUDIN SHAHEED, 
Appellant  
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                            
District Court No. 2-15-cr-00187-002 
District Judge: The Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  May 5, 2017)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Chief Judge 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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The defendant, Salahudin Shaheed, appeals the denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  Shaheed pled guilty at the beginning of his trial shortly 
after the second of his two codefendants pled guilty.  He pled guilty to one count 
each of (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, (2) attempted Hobbs Act 
robbery, and (3) federal kidnapping.  More than two months after he pled guilty, 
but before his sentencing, Shaheed filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  The District Court appointed new counsel for Shaheed and held a two-day 
evidentiary hearing on his motion.  Following the hearing, the District Court 
denied the motion.  Shortly thereafter, the District Court sentenced Shaheed to 240 
months’ imprisonment on the first two counts and 365 months’ imprisonment on 
the third count, each sentence to be served concurrently.  Because Shaheed has 
failed to sufficiently demonstrate entitlement to withdrawal of his guilty plea, we 
will affirm. 
I 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of 
discretion.  See United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 2011).  We 
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review the District Court’s findings of fact related to the motion for clear error.  
See United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 113 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986). 
II 
“[W]ithdrawal of a guilty plea is not an absolute right,” United States v. 
Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005), and so a “defendant is not entitled to 
withdraw [a] plea simply at his whim,” United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 
(3d Cir. 2003).  Rather, under Rule 11(d)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, “[a] defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty . . . after the court accepts 
the plea, but before it imposes sentence if . . . the defendant can show a fair and 
just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”  The defendant has the burden of 
showing a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his guilty plea, and that burden is 
“substantial.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 252.  To determine whether a defendant has 
made that requisite showing, a district court must consider three factors: 
“(1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength of the 
defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government 
would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.”  Id.   
Shaheed directs his arguments at each of those three factors.  First, as to his 
innocence, he claims he asserted and has demonstrated his innocence.  Second, 
regarding the strength of his reasons for withdrawing his plea, Shaheed argues that 
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his trial counsel misled him into believing he could raise disputed factual matters 
at his sentencing; he was under duress when he pled guilty because he lacked 
glasses; his trial counsel told him that his mother wanted him to plead guilty; and 
someone had threatened his sister that she would be killed if he did not plead 
guilty.  Third, as to prejudice, Shaheed contends that the Government has not 
shown it would be prejudiced by the plea withdrawal.  Those arguments fail to 
make an adequate showing that Shaheed should have been permitted to withdraw 
his guilty plea. 
First, Shaheed “did not meaningfully reassert his innocence” after pleading 
guilty.  Id. at 253.  “Bald assertions of innocence are insufficient to permit a 
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.”  Id. at 252; see also United States v. 
Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 818 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Assertions of innocence must be 
buttressed by facts in the record that support a claimed defense.” (quoting United 
States v. Salgado-Ocampo, 159 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1998))).  In his initial 
motion to withdraw his plea, Shaheed made no assertion of innocence.  Only after 
reviewing the Government’s response to his motion, in which the Government 
noted that Shaheed failed to reassert innocence, did Shaheed claim his innocence.  
Shaheed now argues that the lack of DNA or fingerprint evidence demonstrates his 
innocence.  He also points out that none of the victim’s descriptions of the 
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perpetrators resembled him.  The lack of DNA or fingerprint evidence does not 
meaningfully suggest Shaheed’s innocence; many criminal cases have no such 
evidence.  Nor does the misdescription of the perpetrators meaningfully support 
Shaheed’s assertion of innocence, given that the victim was bound and blindfolded 
and her assailants wore masks.  Shaheed also faced significant evidence of guilt, 
including his purchase of the Taser that was used on the victim and inculpating 
testimony from at least one of his codefendants who had already pled guilty.  
Shaheed says nothing to cast doubt on this substantial evidence.  We therefore 
conclude that Shaheed failed to demonstrate that the first Jones factor supports his 
motion.  See Martinez, 785 F.2d at 113 n.1 (noting that the “weight of a 
defendant’s assertions . . . are preeminently issues for the hearing Court to decide” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Gov’t of V.I. v. Berry, 631 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 
1980))). 
Second, Shaheed’s reasons for withdrawing his plea are unpersuasive.  He 
makes four arguments as to this second Jones factor.   
He first contends that his trial counsel told him that he would be able to 
raise disputed matters at his sentencing hearing.  The District Court did not clearly 
err in rejecting that contention.  Trial counsel was an experienced federal criminal 
attorney.  When directly asked by the District Court at the withdrawal motion 
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hearing whether he ever advised Shaheed that “he was to defer any objections or 
any comments with respect to the guilty plea until right before sentencing,” 
Shaheed’s trial counsel adamantly responded that he had not and recalled 
explaining to Shaheed that there “was no going back” if he pled guilty.  JA506.  
Shaheed points to nothing in the record to undermine that assertion, and the 
District Court consequently made no clear error in crediting trial counsel’s 
testimony.   
Shaheed next claims that he did not have his glasses to read his guilty plea 
and that his trial counsel spoke too softly to him when reading him the plea.  
Shaheed, though, did not raise these issues before the District Court at his plea 
colloquy.  The District Court specifically asked Shaheed whether he understood 
the guilty plea document, and he said that he did.  Moreover, his trial counsel 
testified that, when he read Shaheed the guilty plea, Shaheed heard him and 
understood what he was saying.  The District Court did not find Shaheed’s 
assertion to the contrary to be credible.  The District Court did not err.   
Shaheed also asserts that his trial counsel told him that his mother wanted 
him to plead guilty when she purportedly did not.  Trial counsel, however, 
received a text message from Shaheed’s mother the night before Shaheed pled 
guilty stating that she had spoken with Shaheed and that he should “take” the 
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guilty plea.  JA228.  And even if his mother did not want him to plead guilty, it 
cannot be ignored that Shaheed was thirty-four years old at the time of the plea, is 
intelligent, and was a business owner.  He cannot blame his mother’s wishes, 
whether genuine or not, for his decision to plead guilty.  This is hardly the stuff of 
genuine duress. 
Finally, Shaheed argues that his sister was threatened that she would be 
killed if he did not plead guilty.  The District Court concluded that no threat 
occurred, and, even if it did, it did not influence Shaheed’s decision.  The 
circumstances surrounding the threat support the District Court’s conclusion about 
the veracity of Shaheed’s claim.  Shaheed did not explain why anyone would make 
such a threat.  The first threat, which allegedly occurred a day before Shaheed pled 
guilty, was not reported to police until almost a week after Shaheed had pled 
guilty, and the purported police report concerning the threat was never submitted 
into evidence.  Shaheed’s sister refused to cooperate with the FBI in investigating 
the alleged threat.  She also claimed that she received a second threat after 
Shaheed had already pled guilty, undermining the claimed reason for the supposed 
threat.  For his own part, Shaheed never told his trial counsel about the threat.  
Shaheed also failed to satisfactorily explain why he explicitly stated at his change 
of plea hearing that no one made a threat to induce him to plead if this threat did 
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actually occur.  See Siddons, 660 F.3d at 703 (“[A] defendant must also ‘give 
sufficient reasons to explain why contradictory positions were taken before the 
district court.’” (quoting Jones, 336 F.3d at 253)).  Even if the threat before 
Shaheed pled guilty occurred, Shaheed claims that his mother’s whispered 
statement in court, telling him no more than “somebody has threatened [your 
sister] over this,” put him under such duress that he pled guilty the next day.  
JA254.  Yet, despite having the opportunity to follow up with his mother the night 
she told him of the threat, he and his mother made no mention of the threat during 
their multiple telephone conversations.  Thus, given his complete lack of 
knowledge about the circumstances of the threat, the record fails to show that any 
purported threat influenced Shaheed to plead guilty to multiple federal crimes.  
The District Court therefore did not err in rejecting Shaheed’s argument that a 
threat to his sister caused him to plead guilty.  
Third, contrary to Shaheed’s assertion, the District Court correctly found 
that the Government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of his guilty plea.  See 
Jones, 336 F.3d at 252 (stating that the third factor in assessing a guilty plea 
withdrawal is the Government’s prejudice but noting that “the Government need 
not show such prejudice when a defendant has failed to demonstrate that the other 
factors support a withdrawal of the plea”).  In particular, the Government “would 
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have an extremely difficult task to call [the victim] as a witness without causing 
her a severe emotional setback, even assuming that she would be able to testify.”  
JA18.  The District Court found that the victim, who had been “beaten, bound, 
gagged, . . . blindfolded,” and “subject to the use of a Taser,” had been attempting 
to “put her life together” following Shaheed’s guilty plea.  Id.  The Government 
would, of course, also have to arrange again for other civilian and law enforcement 
witnesses after already making those preparations once.  Under these 
circumstances, we cannot say that the District Court’s finding of prejudice is 
clearly erroneous.  
III 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Shaheed’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
 
